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eby submits to theEuropean Parliament the forlowing motion for a resorution..together \"rith
explanatory statement :
MOT]ON FOR A RESOLUTION
on the Tenth Report of the Commrssion of the European Communities on
Competition PoIicy.
The European Parliament,
- having regard to €he'-fenth'hepcirt'of'the-bommission of the nuropein
Communities on Competition policy (Doc. 1-I95/BLl,
- having regard to the report of the Committee on Economic and l,lonetarl,
Affairs End the opinion of the Legal Affairs Committee (Doc. I-689181).
Competition policy objectives
1. Re-emphasizes the importance of competition poricy as one of the
key objectives of the Treaties and indispensabre for a responsilIe
social market economy, but arso underlines that it shourd not be
treated as an objective in isolation but as one of a number of
interrelated Community policies, notably in the fields of
commercial and industrial poticy;
2. Points out, with regard to the increased competitive threat from tLrlrt
countries, that it may prove necessary to interpret
competition policy not merely in terms of the effect.s of a particular
merger or agreement on competition within the Community but also in
terms of the effects on competition with enterprises in non-Community
countries;
3' rndicates, in this context, that there are many sectors where
community industries are too fragmented and consequently at a
disadvaneage with their competitors in other continents and where
much greater cooperation, if not necessarily formal mergers,
need to be encouraged and the existing obstactes to cr-oser
cooperation removedi
4 " calls for more research by the commission into the effects on
commu'ity competitiveness of existing industriar structures,
and also into the implications, both positive and negative, of
i-ncreased industriar- concentration within the conununity; accounE
must also be taken in this context of the competitive position
of community undertakings in the world economy as a whore;
.i.
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5. rlecogni zes
policy may
the needed
obj ect ives ;
that, at a time
occasionally be
rest ructurJ.ng,
of recession, derogutiorr" from competiil;
necestsary for certain industries to permit
but with clear time limits and, clear
compet it ion
context
Community
6- Points out, however, that bhis again illustrates the need for better
integration between ccmPatition and lnduetrial policy objectives at
Community leveI, in order to avoid ad hdc deciEions, to permlt the adoprior
of a communita rather than,purely sectora-i or reqioner-p-Jr]pecti*rg, and t,or
arioic oveilapping nffional meastir-e-s that ybuLd distort the internqr marklt,
7. Again calls for greater coordination between the different departments
of the commission, and for practical steps to be taken to ensure such
coordi nat i on i
qggge of competition po
wercomes the commissionts recent initiatives in the fierd of air
transport and insists yet again on the vital importance of applying
community competition rules in this sector in order to lower fares,
liberarize access to the air transport market, and improve transparency
of air fares and of airtine finanees and statistics,
Notes that the comrni-ssion has just presented a proposed regulation
applying Articre 85 and 86 of the Treaty to sea transport and
hopes that outstanding difficulties in this field can be settred
as soon as possible;
8.
o
10. Calls again on the commission to ensure the apprication ofin the financial and lnsurance sectors, notes in the formerthe recent judgement of the court of Justice affirming that
competition rules apply to banking activities;
! ompe'llt_i_oa p_g l_igy-l el1qr d s e n r e rp r i s e s
11. Awaits the revised proposar of the comrnission for a block exemption
reguration for patent licensing agreements and insists on it beingtransmitted to the parliament for its opinion;
Requests the commi".;o" to ensure that the effects on competition
within the community of the proposed directive and regrulation on trademarks have been fulty analysed;
L2.
Believes that the overall competitive
need to be examined in greater detailjust a legalistic point of view;
effects of distribution agreements
from an economic rather than
13.
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14. Considers, in particular, that the issues posed by parallel
importing need to be closely examined. Believes, in this
context, that there needs to be a balance between opening up
the internal market as fully as possible, and at the same tirne
providing safeguards for capital and labour investments against
speculative importers;
15. Requests to be kept closely informed of the Conmissionrs findings on,
and further intentlons towards, competi,tion with regard to excLusive
supply agreementsi
Expre.sses its r{ish that the commidEion will soon be abre to draw up
general guidelines in the field of selective distribution agreements,
in order to reduee the current uncertainty in this fierd so that
undertakings can gain a better indication of what is and what is not
permi s s ib Ie ;
Regrets yet again the absence of any Council decision on the
commissionrs proposal for a regulation on merger contror, wishes to
know whether, in the light of the objections raised by individual
Member States, the Commission is p).anning to modify its proposals
in any way in order to herp break the current deadrock, and finarry
regue8ts further information on the imprications of successfur
enactment of a merger eontror proposal on the staffing needs of
DG IV;
strongly urges the commission, in the meantime, to continue making
vigorous use of the possibilities granted by Articre g5 of the Treaty
and by the subsequent interpretation of this articLe by the courti
Purther recarrs that action in this sphere, as werr as in the fierds
of information disclosure and contror of transfer pricing abuses, can
help to control any anti-competitive effects caused by nultinationals;
cal1s on the commission to include in its report a review of the
action on the activities of transnational undertakings;
emphasises that organized competition impries that the activities
of transnational undertakings shourd be controlted without
discrimination; deepry regrets that the commlssion has stirr not
submitted a proposar on transfer prices; carrs on the commission
to respond to the repeated reguests made by the European
Parliamerlt for more information on the activities of transnationat
rrrrdort.'rkings by including in its next report a summary of the
proqrcss nrtrde' iD Lhis f ield, both within thc corununity and in the
vnr ious intcrnat ional bodies;
16.
L?.
r8.
-7- PE 74.354/fin.
-_
L9. Ca1ls on the Commission to discuss, pursuant to the Parliamentrs
remar:ks in its previous opinions on competition policy, the
whoLe suhject of competition policy with regard to small and
medium sized enterprises more fully in its next Annual Report,
covering in particular measures to facilitate the creation
of independent firms and the establishment of new undertakings
on oId and new markets;
Community competition policy and national competences
20 - Recognizes the difficurt task facing the commission in policing
national aids and other poricies affecting competition, such
as the creation of new technical barriers to trade, at a time
of economic recession and industrial restructuring, but points
out that these are perhaps the biggest single cause of distor-
tions of competrtion within the commu.ity, and consequentry
urges the commiss-i-on to show the maximum vigirance in ensuring
that Lhe rnternar market is strengthened by eliminating
r-echnicar. anci admrnistrative barriers to trade and preventing
the creation of new barriers;
2i-. Recalls that the inadequate harmonization of raws and the lack
of transparency rvith regard to public contracts seriously
hampers rhe standardization of the conditions of competition;
tlmphasizes again the significance of the commission,s directive to
ensure greaLer transparency of financial relations between l{ember
States and publj-c undertakings, regrets that its scope is not even
wider, and expresses its strong critjcism of the action of the l,rc.nch,
rtalian and ti.K. governments in trying to have this directivc
annulled;
23" Expresses its concern at the incre.asing tendency noted by the
commission not to notify certain aios E-anr-ed and strongly supports
the commission's decision to write to all ivlember states reminding
them of their obligations under Article 93-3 of the EEc rreatyi
24.
22
Further suggests, in the interests of
be useful, in an annex to forthcoming
appropriate or perhaps more frequently
state aids notified to the Commissioni
transparency, that it might we1l
Annual Reports, or in another
updated form, to ]ist all the
strongly supports the central principles emphasized in the philipMorris case, and intends to crosery monitor the way in which thisdecision wiIl affect subsequent Commission practice;
25
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_t26 ' APproves the general positions taken by the commission with
regard to sectorar- and regional aids, but insists that theseactions need to form part of more integrated Community
strategies towards these sectors and regions, for instancein the sectors of shipping and shipbuilding, and of cars;
asks for the next report. to contain precise information onthe results of the aiils granted and in respect of theduration of those aids;
27- Again firmly underrines the importance of adjusting st.t. monopories
of a commerciar character and regrets the recent }ack of progress inthis sphere;
2A.
29.
30.
Regrets that the chapter on developments in nationalpolicy faits to outl_ine the situation with regard topolicies;
calrs for the implications of spanish and portuguese entry into the
community for competition policy to be fulry explored, as considerabreproblems of adjustment are likely to be encountered;
i-$etrylional_ issues
Notes with approvar the adoption by the u.N. Generar Assembly of a
set of principres and rules for the control of restrictive businesspractices, but regrets that there is currently deadl0ck on theparallel negotiations on the proposed internationar code of conduct
on the transfer of technology, but points out, however, in this latter
context, that if overly restrictlve rules are adopted, a lowering oftechnology transfers to developing countries might welr resulti
Points out that the issues posed by the extra-territoriar application
of competition laws, as shown by the enactment of ,,blocking, laws in
certain community countries and by possible problems in the field of
sea transport, and of disclosure of documents, are growing in
importancer dDd considers that earlier consultation between qovernmqnts
and wider internationar agreement on the taking of evidence abroad inciviL and commercial matters might well, 
€rmong other possible steps, Ibe appropriate in the future;
competition
Greek competitiort
31.
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32' Takes the view that the community cannot, without weakening
its own posit,ion, create a genuine internal competition poricy
unress it actively seeks to extend the rules it imposes onitsclf to the other eountrles of the world; calJs on the
commission, therefore, not to confine itserf srmpry to participatingin the activities of the internatsionar bodies concerned but to
contribute its utmost to:
the campaign against international tax evasion,
the abolition of tax havens, ,
the elimination of flags of convenience,
the abolition of other unfair practices in the fierd of competition;
Emphasises the cardinar rore prayed by the commission in the
application of Articles g5 and g6 0f the EEC Treaty and ofArticles 65 and 66 of the ECSC Treaty, appreciates theincreasingly cornplex tasks faced by t.he commission in the
enforcement of Community competition policy, and ca1ls for
an increase in the number of staff in DG IV, including an
appropriate number with practical industriar experience;
Believes, however, that the Corunisslon has failed to provide
satisfactory answers to the criticisms aimed at its procedureby various organizations and also the requests on this subjectin previous opinions of the parLiament; and urges it again to
seek to implement a more rapid and more transparent procedurefor deaLing with cases submitted to it;
carls on the commissionr therefore, to report back to parliamentwithin the next year with proper appraisal 0f the advantages anddisadvantages of the foll0wing major suggestions for improving itsprocedures: 
-
the possible estabrishment of an intermediate tribunal to dealwith competition cases, and to review questions of fact, Ieavingthe present Court of .Iustice as a final court of appeal, dealingessentially with points of Iaw;
the possible appointment of an independent person or persons, fromwithin the Commission but independent of DG IV, or else appointedby the court, who would participate in the investigative processand handle certain procedural aspectsi
possible ways of expediting procedures for granting exemptions,such as that di scussed in point 72 0f the expranatory statementbelow;
33.
34.
35.
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36' calls for more inrormation to be provided in the Annuar Reports anoin other publications, on the principles and criteria guiding the
Commission in reaching its informal settlements, in order to provide
more guidance for affected undertakings;
37 - underlines the need to remove the lack of regal certainty
as to the status of notified new agreements, by requiring
the commission to issue preriminary decisions, analogous to thepreliminary opinions provided for by Article 15(6) of
Reguration l7/62 within a fixed time limit, and of ,comfort
letters' by requiring the commission to dear with every
notification or application for negative clearance by formal
decisions or certification and to publish the same;
3 8' wercomes the possibilities opened up in the fierd of interim
procedures and hopes that they wilr'be used when appropriate by theCommission;
39. caIIs for the views of industry associations, trade unions,
consumer and other groups with regard to general 0r specific
aspects of comrnunity competition policy to be described in
future Annual Reports in order to ensure their closer
participation in the development of community competition
policy as previousty ca11ed for by the parliament;
calls on the commission to make alr necessary arrangements
to provide more extensive ir.;orrnation on the aims and
principles of its competition poricy to consumer associations
and to trade union and employers, associations;
Takes the view that the commission should seek the cooperation
and support of all interested parties 
- consumers' organizations,
r:ational monopolies commissions and the Economic and
social committee - in order to improve its possibirities for
action through a better exchange of information and by
pooling available resources and experience acquired; i
40' Catls for a reinforcement of the economic assessment capabilities of
DG IV and for its economic research to be better integrated with the
rest of its activities, and again reminds the Commission that more
thorough economic research courd back up competition poricy in such
fielcis as the definition of the relevant market (which might well be a
worldwide market in some cases), the advantages and disadvantages of
further economic concentrations, the achievements and failures of
crisis carters and the longer-term impacts of state aids.
-11 - PE 74.354/fin.
4L. Regrets the fact that a number of the recommendations approved
by the Parliament in its previous opinions otr competitiort
policy have not been acted upon, nor sometimes even acknowledged
by the Commission. Insists that in each subsequent report
subjects previously raised by the Parliament receive an effective
response from the Commission;
42. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the
Council and Commission.
-L2- PE 74.354/fin.
1.
B
EXPLAi{ATORY STATEIV1ENT
INTRODUCTION
Competition policy is one of the pillars of the Treaties, and one of
the areas where the Community has direct powers. These powers must
be used even more energetically in the future, to protect the consumer
by controlling both the abuses of private and state enterprises acting
in collusion with others or exploiting individual dominant positions,
as well as those protectionist measures of national governments anq
their agencies which can distort competition to an even greater
extent.
Nevertheless, the objectives of Community competition policy need to
be coordinated srith other Community policies so as to avoid possible
conflictsr particularly at a time like the present of intensified
commercial competition from third countries, and of economic
recession. This is why the first section of this report consists of
an examination of the overall objectives of Community competition
policies and their relationship with other policies, notably
commercial and industrial policies.
3. The second section briefly examines the field of scope of competition
policy and its needed extension into sectors such as sea, ano
particularly air transport, where it again emphasizes the neeo for
real progress in this sphere.
The third section examines the development of Community policy towards
private enterprises as outlined in the Commission's report, and the
fourth section looks at the complex area of the relationship between
Community competition policy and national competences, that is to say
the issues posed by differences in national competition laws, by
state aids and state monopolies and by the public sector in general.
A short fifth section reviews some of the international issues that
have arisen over the last year.
The administration of competition policy is emphasized in a further
section of the report. The Commission is clearly understaffeo to
meet its important competition policy responsibilities. At the same
time, however, as putting its political weight behind an increase in
Commission resources devoted to competition policy, the Parliament
also recognizes that a number of criticisms continue to be maoe about
the implementation of competition policy, and that these criticisms
nced to be studiecl and possible remedies put forward.
2.
4.
5.
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6, Fina11y, the report comments on the economic research section of the
Commission's report and makes some suggestions as to the way future
Commission reports might be improved.
Objectives of_c@
7. The purpose of thj-s first section of the report is to examine the
objectives of Community competition policy within the broaoer context
of Community policies as a whole.
8. The central objective of Community competition policy should be that,
wherever, there should be real and undistorted competition. It is
undesirable that firms and citizens should have no effective choices
in their economic activities, and thus be at the mercy of their
customers or suppliers (or indeed an association of their competitors).
It is also undesirable that firms should lack the stimulus which
competition provides to greater enterprise, efficiency and to suitable
adaptations to changed circumstances. But, where these dangers are
absent or minimal, pursuit of the letter of competition law can be
unprofitable and may be counterproductive; the Treaties themselves
acknowledge certain exceptions to the general rules as outlined, for
instance, in Articles 85 (3)r 92 (2) and 92 (3) of the EEC Treaty.
9. Interpretation of the general rules of conpetition, an<i the exceptions
provided, is particurarry difficurt at a time like the present, when
community industry is faced with accentuated competition from
enterprises from third countries, and when industrial restructuring
is often necessary to face up to the conseguences of recession and
changing industrial circumstances.
10. With regard to intensified competition from outside, it is clear that
the achievement of satisfactory competition within the Community can
be outweighed if major inroads are being made by imports from the
enterprises of third countries. While the consumer may often benefit,
there are also serious costs of such inroads as well, in terms of the
potentially far-reaching effects on the industrial structure of the
Community, and also on employment. In these circumstances the
achievement of competition within the Community must also be balanced
by an evaluation of the competitive situation of Community enterprises
within the world economy as well.
11. This issue was raised, for instance, in the context of parliamentis
recent opinion on the European automobile industry (OJ C.28,9.2.8I p.19),
which argued that the European industry, not just the large integrated
manufacturers but even the associated component manufacturers, was
much more fragmented than that of its competitors. rt went on to
-L4- PE 74.354/tin.
state (point 12) t'that the communityrs competition poricy must be
viewed not merely in an intra-Community context, but also in the light
of the need to ensure that undertakings are able to compete effectively
and on an egual footing with third country manufacturers',.
12. This sort of consideration poses broad questions about the nature of
industrial policy at Community 1evel. fn the 1960's Community policy
towards industry appeared to be leaning towards the promotion of large
European-scale enterprises to compete more effectively with often
much larger non-EEC firms, but this has been downptayed in recent
years.
13. It would certainly appear that the experience of formal mergers between
enterprises in different Member states has not always proved very
successful. In addition a certain concern has developed about some
of the diseconomies (instead of just the economies) of scale involved
in very large enterprises. There has also been a certain academic
literature concerned with the adverse effects of mergcrs, and of
increased industrial concentration.
On the other hand, there may at times have been over-concern about
the negative effects of bigness and an over-emphasis on the virtues
of smarrness. rn certain sectors and, in certain circumstances,
such as particularly fierce foreign competition, or rapid technological
change, increased concentrations may well be desirable.
L4 What this would appear to indicate is that there is a need for:
more analysis into the effects, both positive and negatj-ve, of
increased industrial concentration, and of mergers;
more analysis into why the experience with mergers across
national boundaries has not been more successful;
most fundamentally of all, more study of the consequences of
the Corununity's current industrial structure not just for
competition within the Community, but for Community
competitiveness within the world market.
15. A further implication is that there needs to be much closer cooperation
between the directorate-general responsible for competition and the
other departments of the Commission, notably with DG fII, responsible
for industrial policies and the internar market. This is not to
suggest that competition policy needs to be subordinate Lo a
'rdirigiste" and precisely defined industrial strategy, but that overall
there needs to be better integration between competition and industrial
policy objectives.
-15- pE 14.354/fin.
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15. This is also illustrated by a set of problems where a balance may
often need to be found between competition policy and other objectives,
those posed by the restructuring of industries in crisis. problems
are posed all the way along the rine for competition policy, in that
carters may be formed, derogations may have to be granted from
competition rules, and state aj-ds may be granted whose compatj.bility
with competition rules may often be extremely difficult to assess.
Pragmatic judgements will be necessary in these cases; what is clear
is that competition policy cannot be the only criterion for judgement.
Nevertheress, these decisions should not just be taken on an ad hoc
basis. There is a need for community-wide rather than merery narrow
sectorar criteria to be taken into account. Again industrial,
commercial and social poricy factors, as werr as one of regional
balance, need to be evaruated. I4ere assurances that adequate
coordination exists is not enough; there needs to be more evidenee
that it is a reality.
Extengion of scope of Community competition policy
18. The Tenth Report concentrates on two key areas where the competition
policy rules of the Community have not been applied, and where the
Parl-iament has consistentry insisted on their application, air
transport and sea transport,
Arr-!rg!sp9r!
19. At a time when popurar support for the community is not at a high
leveIr particularly in certain countries, more tangible evidence that
Community citi-zens can benefit from Community action would l:e of qreat
vafue. I'luch firmer application of the rules of competition to the air
transport sector courd provide such evidence. As parriament has
pointed out in the past, the current fare system Lacks transparency
and is too costly, access to the scheduled air transport market needs
to be Iiberalized and there needs to be much greater transparency of
airline finances and statistics. While certain safeguards should
remain, much can and should be done in this field.
20- The commj-ssion outlines the problems that are invorved in making
progress in this sphere in points 11 to 14 of its Report. rt shows
the step-by-step approach that would have to be adopted and the
difficulties that would arise at each step.
Firstl.y the commission would have to promurgate a regulation to give
itself the power to investigate and punish infringements, but, as the
commisslon itself admits, this wourd have onry rimited appJ_ication(such as in the area of charter services) since it is chiefry
governments who have the final say, for instance, in setting fares for
scheduled services.
2t
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22.
The Commission would, consequently, then have to decide whether to
challenge the conduct of the Member States themselves, as opposed to
the individual airlines.
The next step would be to consider whether national air tariff
regulations were contravening Articles 85 and 86 and whether they
fell within the exemptions provided. Such an exanination would be
lengthy and would have to be done on a case-by-case basis.
Finally, the Cornmission would have to assess Article 90(2) of the
EEC Treaty which states that the rules of competition should apply
to public undertakings, r'insofar as the application of such rules
does not obstruct the performance, in law or of fact, of the
particular tasks assigned to themrr.
Whatever the difficulties, however, the current situation is
indefensible. The Commission illustrates this with its description
(in points 135 to I38 of its Report) of its handling of the Sterling
Alrways case, when the latter airline lodged complaints against SAS
and the Danish government.
fn the course of its lnvestigation the Commission encountered initial
difficulty in acguiring the needed information from the Danish
government. Although it then found evidence that might indicate a
prima facie infringement of Article 86 in 1977 and L978, by the time
the ComrnlEgion was in a position to do anything it felt that the
sltuation had eased and that there were no longer any grounds for it
to conslder further action. The whole procedure is cumbersome and
unsatisfaetory.
Furthermore, the difficulties that are described of the Commission
trying to establish a valid eomparison between the existing service
of SAS and the proposed service of Sterling Airways, including
assumptions about the relative attractions for passengers of being
able to make, or not make, advance bookings or change their flights,
indlcate the advantages of much bolder deregulation where the consumer
himself would be left to make the decisions,
The Commission has recently decided to formally propose a regulation
to the Council extendlng the application of EEC Treaty competition
rules to air transport. At the same time the Commission has also
Bdopted a report concerning passenger air fares on EEC scheduled
flights. The Commieeion hae further announced that it will be asking
the EEC aovernments to subnit to it information on air fare pollcy by
the mtddle of October, and to request lnformation from the varlous
alrlines coneerning such practices as rules on luggage weight, meals
23.
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served to passengers, and others agreed between airlines. A draft
directive on procedures for the control of air fares may then be
submitted.
These initiatives should be strongly welcomed, and progress in this
sphere will have to be closely monitored.
9ee-!res9p9r!
24. The Report also outlines how the Commission had intended proposing a
draft regulation to the Council applying Articles 85 and 85 of the
Treaty to Sea Transport.
25. The position so far has been that the Conmunity has not yet endorsed
the United Nations Code of Conduct for Liner Conferences, which was
adopted in L974 but has not yet come into force. The Commission
would like to see this endorsed, but at the same time feels that its
provisions need to be supplemented. Certain points need to be
explicitly spelled out "which the code does not touch upon or on which
its provisions are not mandatory" (point 10).
National sea transport experts, however, apparently seem to prefer a
simple endorsement of the U.N. code, and the Commission
consequently postponed the presentation of its proposal to the Councill
The reasons for the reluctance of the national experts are unfortunately
not clearly spelled out in the report. It is to be hoped that
consultations with the Member States can solve the outstanding
difficulties as soon as possible and the Parliament should be kept
closely informed of new developments.
The development of competition policy towards enterplises
26. The Tenth Report outlines developments in this sphere in the chapter
on main oevelopments in Community policy, in which it discusses
proposed regulations and also the main Court decisions interpreting
Article 85 and in the chapter on main decisions and measures taken by
the Commission in which it outtines some of the central issues that
have been raised in individual cases with which it has dealt.
27. The number of such cases is very Iarge. The commission rists 4,203
pending cases on 3l December 1980, (3,775 applications or notifications,
233 complaints from firms and 195 proceedings on the Comnissionts oern
initiative). And yet only 25 formal decisions were taken during the
year (of which only 9 applying Articles 85 and 85 of the EEC Treaty),
and 183 informal settlements.
i-*" 
""r*i*ee notes^that.a proposal (COM (gf) 423 fin.) has just beentransmitt d to the Council_
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642 of. the pending cases concerned licensing agreements, Z5Z
distribution agreements and rlE horizontar agreements. rn this
context the importance of block exemptions is obvious, in reducing
the work load of the commission and creating greater certainty for
enterpr ises.
Pe!es!-lrseBsUs
28. rn the light of the above figures adoption of a brock exemption
regulation for patent licensing agreements would clearly be a
particularly useful step, provided that it is welr thought out and
broadry acceptabre. Nevertheress the Report states that progress
on the commission's draft btock exemption regulation has had to be
postponed, pending the Court,s decision in the ,Breeders, rights -
maize seed" case, which raises a number of key regal issues in this
field.
Marked differences in view between the Commission, betvreen groups who
feel that the proposed regulation would restrict industrial property
rights too far, and others such as the consumers consurtative
committee, who feel that the proposal is too weak, are described in
the Report (in point 5). The Commission should again be reminded
that, when the new draft is ready, it should be sent to the Parliament,
so that it can give its opinion on this important proposar, on which
subject serious doubts have been raised.
Exclusive 4eelrsg-esg-s9les!1ye-g]s!Erbs!]es-ssEeeges!g
The general issues posed by exclusive dealing agreements and by
selective distrihution agreenents, aro also touched on in the rep()rt.
Regulation 57/67 has provided for block exemptions for exclusive
dearing agreements. The commission had originally intended to amend
this before it expired at the end of 1982 but the draft that they
produeed in February 1978 was so criticized, notably on the grounds
that it would create far more uncertainty for firms as to whether
they felI within the category exemption, that this approach was
abandoned. As outlined in the Report the Commission has now concluded
its work on a new draft block exemption Regulation on exclusive
dealing agreements which will replace Regulation 67/67 EEC from
1 January 1983.
Though no really major changes are anticipated there are still a
number of provisions which create considerable uncertainty as to their
full implications, such as proposed Article 3(b) providing that the
block exemption would not apply where the goods to which the contract
related were not available from independent intermediaries and
29.
30.
31.
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proposed Article 3(c) providing it to be sufficient to exclude the
block exemption that one of the participants to an agreement makes
it difficuft for intermediaries or consumers to obtain the goods
to which the contract relates from other dealers, within or outside
the Comnunity. The uncertainties which these proposeci Articles, in
particular, raise need to be clarified and Parliament should also
be coneulted on this.
The situation is not very clearly outlined with regard to exclusive
supply agreements. These are currently covered by the block exemption,
but the Commission merely states that it is considering whether the
appropriate rules for such cases should not form the subject of a
separate regulation. The Commission has produced a draft regulation
covering "tied house" agireements for beer but further clarifications
as to the Commission's longer-term intentions towards other networks
of exclusive supplying agreements, such as solus site agreements for
petrol, would be he1pful. In the meantime, the Commission would now
appear to be putting forward a draft regulati.on, providing for
exclusive supply agreements to be covered by the block exemption
until 1984 as a provisional measure.
The effects of networks of similar contracts on the workings of
competition within the Common Market is clearly a subject which merits
closer examj.nation. As stated by the Commission such networks could
clearly jeopardize the maintenance of effective competition, but they
could also have economic advantages as weIl. The Parliament should
be kept closely informed of the Commission's findings in this area.
At the moment the block exemption provides some certainty in this
field; if exclusive supply agreements were not to benefit from a
new block exemption after 1984, with the exception of one or two
Iimited sectors, this degree of certainty would be lost.
The Commission is apparently also considering further action in the
field of selective distribution agreements, but it is planning
to wait until a number of further decisions have been taken in
individual cases before establishing general guidelines. It is,
however, planning to finalise in the near future a draft block
exemption regulation for selective distribution systems in the motor
i ndust ry.
It is to be hoped that the Commission will soon be able to draw up
general guidelines in order to reduce the current state of uncertainty
in this field so that firms can gain a better indication of what is
and what is not permissible.
33.
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34. It is also clear that the whole area of distribution agreements needs
to be examined in greater detail from an economic point of view. A
recent article(1) for instance, has argued cogently that "there is a
need for the Commission to analyze in much greater dcpth the eeonomic
structure and performance of the markets in which exclusive
distributorship agreements are made in order that it can take an
informed view of the balance of advantage and disadvantage in such
cases". It argues, inter alia, that the "Commissionts analysis of
the possible advantages of exclusive suppl-y agreements seems to have
been inadequate" and that there has, perhaps, been an over-emphasis
on the problems caused by parallel imports since, in certian
circumstances "territorial restrictions may be essential to provide
protection for desirable dealer services, while if there is effective
interbrand competition, any adverse effects may be minimal". On the
other hand, other anticompetitive practices may be insufficiently
emphasized.
Similarly it may not always be helpful to judge selective distribution
systems primarily on whether they are based on objective criteria of
a qualitative nature, since such agreements based on quantitative
criteria may well be justifiable in certain circumstances.
The comments of the Economic and Social Comrnittee in its recently
adopted opinion(2) on Corununity Competition Policy in the light of
the current economic and social situation should also be noted in
this context, in which it states (page 23) that "$rhen exclusive
dealing arrangements and selective distribution systems are being
considered, due weight should be given to their constructive
contribution in sectors where there are objective reasons for a high-
grade, well-organized distribution system Iinked, inter aIia, to the
nature of the product and the responsibilities of the producers".
AII this indicates the need for comprehensive and empirical economic
analysis into the overall effects on competitiveness of particular
agreements, and particular industry structures, in order to avoid an
overly legalistic perspective and an over-concentration on theoretical
cr iter i a.
Such analysis should not be an end in itself. Where possible, clear
cut rules should be derived. Nevertheless, competition policy will
fficlusive distributorship arrangements with
special reference to EEC Competition Policy". John Chard.
The Antitrust Bulletin,/Summer 1980.
( 2 ) ces 56118r p<1
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have to maintain a certain flexibility to take account of changing
economic circumstances.
U9rs9r-s9s!r9ls
35. The Parliament once again notes the absence of any Council decision
on the Commissionts proposal for a regulation on merger control,
submitted to the Council on 20 July 1973. The Parliament has on
numerous occasions expressed its strong regret at this delay, and
called for the proposal's enactment as soon as possible.
The Parliament notes, however, the com[ents of the Economic and
SociaI Committee on this subject, in which its opinion states(op. cit., page 24) that "business mergers should be vetted, though
many cyclical and structural factors, including at the present time
employment difficulties, militate in favour of policies free of legal
and other rigidities". Certainly there is a danger of considerable
delays being caused in mergers going through, with consequent
uncertainty and possible adverse effects on the undertakings
concerned, which will have to be carefully balanced against the need
for the prevention of certain harmful concentrations at Community
Ievel. The comments made earlier in this report about the need to
examine competition policy in a world-wide and not just Community
context, also need to be recalled at this juncture.
Parriament wi r1 be forlowing crosery the definition of the rerevant
criteria for the evaluation of mergers at Community leve1.
rt would arso be herpful to know whether the commission is intending
to modify its original proposals in any way, for instance, with
regard to the time taken for approvals.
A further point on which guidance from the Commission would be
appreciated is the impricatj.ons of successful enactment of a merger
control proposal on the staffing needs of DG IV, since the extra
demands on its resources wiII surely be considerable.
rn the meantime the commission must be strongry urged to make vigorous
use of the possi.birities granted by Articre 86 of the Treaty and by
the subsequent interpretation of this article by the Court.
36. Among a number of important other cases described in the Report in the
chapter on main decisions and measures taken by the Commission, the
following points can be singled out:-
- the Commissionrs statement (in its description of its decisions
in the French and German special steet producers cases in point 109
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of the Report) that "poor demand and excess capacity do not justify
producers breaking the competition rules of the EEC Treaty't; this
is an important point of principle deserving of longer discussion;
the Conunission's decision to impose for the first time a fine for
an export ban in the pharmaceutical industry (Johnson and Johnson
case, point II7 of the Report);
its clarification as to under what conditions and to what extent
a joint buying pool is compatible with the Community competition
rules (National Sulphuric Acid Association case, point lI2 of the
Report ) ;
- the Commission's continuing efforts (as in the tloulinex and
Bauknecht cases, . point 121 of the Report) to persuade firms to
extend guarantee terms to provide coverage throughout the
Community
A further comment concerns small and medium-sized enterprises.
In its description of the Solnhofener Natursteinplatten case (in
point 114 of the Report) the Corunission states that it resrilted in
the spelling out once again of the conditions for cooperation between
small businesses consistent with the ru1es of oompetition. An earlier
association of the same producers had been struck down by the
Commission but negative clearance was granted for a new association
providing for a more limited cooperation between the undertakings
concerned.
NevertheLess, while noting with interest this particular decision,
the Committee feels that, pursuant to its remarks in its previous
reports on competition policy, the whole subject of competition
policy with regard to small firms needs to be discussed more fully
in a subsequent Annual Report.
It should also be noted that certain other important issues, such as
the field of trademarks, the control of transfer pricing abuses, and
application of the rules of competition policy in the financial and
insurance sectors, all mentioned in recent Parliament opinions on
competition policy, have not been tackled in the Tenth Report.
Community competition policy and national competences
The relationship between Community competition policy and national
competences, the issues raised by state aids and state monopolies,
and the different scope of national competition laws, raise problems
38.
39.
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of particular difficulty for the Community. Not only is there the
problem mentioned in the first section of this report, of having to
balance community competition and other policy objectives, regional,
social, industrial and so on, but also of asserting Community over
purely national and sectoral objectives.
I!e-reei-f er- !seesPsrelsY
40. If difficult economic and other judgements are to be made at Community
Ievel it is essential that adequate information is put at the
Community's disposal. The need for the maximum possible transparency
j,s thus of central importance.
41. The significance of the first directive to ensure greater transparency
of financial relations between Member States and public undertakings
( 80/723/EEc) must again be strongly emphasized. Although the
difficutties involved are understandable it is to be regretted that
its scope is not even wider, since many of the most important public
monopoly sectors, such as posts and telecommunications and transport,
are excluded, as well as all public undertakings whose turnover is
Iess than 40 million units of account. Strong criticism must again
be expressed of the action of the French, Itallan and U.K.
governments in trying to have this directive annulled.
Ne! ification of aids
42. The Parliament also notes with concern, in the context of state aids,
the growing tendency which is outlined in the Commission report,
and which is "particularly marked in certain Ivlember States, not to
fu1fil the obligations laid down by Article 93(3) EEC in respect of
notification of aid cases and their non-implementation during the
time allowed to the Commission to evaluate their compatability with
the Treaty" - a tendency which it sees as indicating "the possible
existence of a general decision not to respect the provisions in
question". The Conmission is particularly concerned about this in the
already difficult area of general aid schemes,
The Parliament thus strongly supports the Commission's decision to
write to all. Member States reminding them of their obligations under
Article 93(3) of the EEC Treaty. A further suggestion is that it
might well be useful, in an annex to forthcoming Annual Reports or
in another appropriate, and perhaps more frequently updated form, to
provide a list of all the state aids notified to the Commission, thus
providing a handy check list for interested parties and making at least
somewhat more transparent cases where no notification is provided.
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43. As regards the aids mentioned in the reportr particularly difficult
problems seem to be posed by general aids, those which are neither
sectorally nor regionally specific. In this context the Court,s
decision in the Philip lvlorris case appears to be of special
importance for the interpretation of the Community rules of
competition. The Commission's conclusions from the Court's judgement
is again worth citing (paragraph 216 of the Tenth Report); r,state
aids are in principle incompatible with the common market. The
discretionary power of the Commission should only be exercised when
the aids proposed by Member States conrribute to the achievement of
the Community objectives and interest set out in Article 92(3) EEC.
The national interest of a Member State or the benefits obtained by
the recipient of aid in contributing to the national interest do not
by themselves justify the positive exercise of the Commisslon's
discretionary powers".
Of course the assessment of what is of Community, rather than of
merely national interest is not always easy. The central principles
re-emphasized in the Philip Morris case, however, should be strongly
supported. The Parliament looks forward to closely ttiowlrg the way in
which the decision wilI affect subsequent Commission practice,
Il9rree!-e1qs-ssq-s9s!ersl- s!4-regrelgl-el4s
AC
A further important issue underlined by the Commission is the
possibility of Member States circumventing the controL system on
national aids through the granting of indirect aids, and it cites two
such cases which have been dealt with in the last year.
The Parliament srrpports action in this field, and also notes with
approval the positions taken by the Commission with regard to sectoral
and regional aids, and would merely add, however, that such actions
need to form part of more integrated Community policies towards these
sectors and regions.
In the section on aids to shipbuilding, for instance, the Commission
says that Lhe proposed Fifth Directive wiII give it scope to examine
whether aids to shipowners are, in present conditions, having an
effect similar to aids to shipbuilding. This is a field where on
several occasions Parliament has called for an overall industry policy
embracing the interdependent sectors of shipping, shipbuilding,
ship-repairing and commercial trade policy.
44.
46.
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47. In the car sector the Parliament has called for the establishment of
an overall Community strategy. The Parliament welcomes, therefore,
the Commission's statement that it is prepared to recognize the value
of certain forms of cooperation between undertakings as well as
certain aids in order to help create a favourable environnent for the
industry to take full advantage of the Community market, and to
compete more effectively with third country producers.
Overa1I the Parliament recognizes the difficult task facing the
Commission in policing national aids, and in interpreting its
discretionary powers, at a time of economic recession and industrial
restructuring, and can only urge the maximum vigilance in ensuring
that, along with parallel action in the elimination of bechnical
barriers to trade, the internal market is strengthened and not
undercut 
"
44iss!sel! 
-e[-s!e!e-Belepe]1eE
The adjustment of state monopolies of a commercial eharacter is a
further area where the Tenth Report indicates lmportant remaining
problems, and where "increasing national resistance is being
encountered". Again the Commission is forced to state (paragraph 228)
that "the disregard of time limits for answering enquiries is causing
considerable delays to the Commission's work in this area".
Delays are particularly marked with regard to the adjustment of the
French and Italian manufactured tobacco monopolies, and the Commission
has initiated infringement procedures in both cases, as welI as
against Italy for its failure to carry out sufficient adjustment of
its matches monopoly.
The Parfiament again firmly underlines the importance of making
further progress in this field.
qr qper ] ! le:- i!-!e!!e!31-eeupe!r! 19!-pglt9les
50, The Tenth Report again demonstrates the continued existence of major
djsparities in the individual competition policies of the Member
states, as outlined in the chapter on main developments in national
competition policies. These national policies range from ones where
competition policy is treated as a major objective in its own right,
to l-ess activist policies but where competition policy i.s stiIl an
important factor among a number of factors, to ones where it is
either weak or practically non-existent. The lack of any change in
the latter situation is noted regularly in each Annual Report of the
Commission.
48.
49.
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Different conceptions of competition policy are clearly linked to
differing national circumstances and economic philosophies. It is
clearly impractical, and indeed undesirable, to seek for them to be
harmonized. It is, nevertheless, r.rorth emphasizing that vigorous
national competition policies can help to back up the community's own
competition policy, and that the complete absence of any national
policy may help to create distortions within the internal market.
51. It would have been helpful if the chapter on developments in national
competition policies had outlined the situation with regard to Greek
competition policies.
52. The implications of enlargement for competition policy needs to be
further explored. The Report hints at one problem in the area of
plant breeders'rights and trade marks (paragraph 135) where it states
that the practice of third part ies in Spain systemat ical 1y registerinq
as trade marks varietal names of plants appoarinc in tlre comm()n
catalogue of varieties of agricultural plant species could represenl
a substantial barrier to the freer movement of goods and eompetition
when Spain accedes to the Community"
Other problems will undoubtedly be encountered in the process of
transition from a relatively closed economy to the much more open
environment within the Common Market.
International issues
53. With regard to international issues the Tenth Report outl ines the
developments in OECD and in UNCTAD, and describes eooperation
between the Commission and the anti-trust authorities of non-member
countries.
9.E:9.P.
54. In the light of the earlier remarks in this report the current
cmphasis within OECD on obtaining more information on mergers and
concentrations is to be welcomed. A further point not covered in the
Commissionrs report, however, andwhich would be helpful to know, is
the use that has been made so far of the chapter on competition in
the OECD guidelines.
9,'N.''-eel99li!e9-9!-re9!rr9!tv9-pssi!e99-Pree!i999
55. The Parliament notes with approval
Nations General Assembly adopted a
equitable principles and rules for
that on 5 December 1980 the United
"set of multilaterally agreed
the control of restrictive
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business practices", and that the commission welcomes the result of
the negotiations as meeting "the fundamental concerns of the
Community.....". Such broadly applicable guidelines should perform
a valuabre function. Although non-binding, and capabre of interpreta-
tion in different ways by governments with very different conceptions
of competition policy, they should at least provide a framework on
which to build.
Erspssc9-s999-9!-s9!gsg!_e!_!esbsgleey transfer
56. On the other hand it is noted that there is currently a deadlock on
the paralle1 negotiations within UNCTAD on the proposed international
code of conduct on the transfer of technology. The problems involved
are listed by the Commission. The core of the dispute would seem to
be that the negotiations on the chapter on restri.ctive business
practices are less concerned with the types of abuse that are
generally condemned by competition law within the Community and within
the industrialized world as a whole, but instead with the attempt by
certain developing countries to impose greater control over the terms
of involvement of foreign business within their countries. The issue
of parent-subsidiary relations within multinationals is a related and
important point of dispute. what is being negotiated is clearry
little to do with traditional competition policy concepts.
The legitimate concern of developing countries must be recognized,
and it is to be hoped that agreement wilr be reached. rt wourd be
herpful, hovrever, if a more flexibLe attitude courd prevair on the
part of the developing countries. overry restrictive rures might
merely result in a lower level of technoJ_ogy transfer to the
developing countries.
9.'.N:-9949
57. rn another sphere it would be useful to know what progress is being
made with the chapter on competition of the proposed United Nations
Code on Transnational Corporations which is currently being
negot iat ed.
Ex!re:!err1!9rr3I_sppllgs! ]e!_9!_egBpe!r!r9s_less
58. A final point on which more emphasis should be put in a subseguent
Commission report is the issue of the extra-territorial application
of competition laws, and the clashes that this can cause. The Tenth
Report cites the growing cooperation between the Commission and the
anti-trust authorities of non-member countries, and this is to be
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strongly wercomed. Nevertheress, while the community as such has not
been primarily involved, the question of extra-territorial application
of u.s. competition laws in particurar has been seen as sufficiently
important to justify nblocking" laws being enacted in the rast year
by France and the United Kingdom against the extra-territorial effect
of foreign laws on actions by their domestic firms, and in particular
against the communication of information or the supply of documents.
Any directive on extending competition to the sea transport sector
will clearly involve possible clashes of jurisdiction.
59. Clearly this whole set of issues is of considerable importance, and
merits further discussion. Among the ideas that have been put
forward in this context is a possible code on the extra-territorial
application of competition laws, perhaps including conciliation and
arbitration provisions. Even if such ideas are not practicarry
feasible there shourd at reast be more consurtations between
governments before proceedings are instituted, and there should also
be much wider agreement on the taking of evidence abroad in civi I antl
commercial matters.
A further issue is that of export cartels. National attitudes to
these vary greatry, and they are specificarly arlowed or subject to
few contrors in many countries. National attitudes towards the
export cartels of other countries, however, are much more
unfavourable. Some tlpe of international agreement on these could
well be useful.
conduct of Community competition policy 
- Commission powersprocedures
60- The ways in which competition poricy has been implemented by the
Commission has been the subject of considerable debate in recent years,
concerning the resources and powers of the Commission, and the
fairness and effectiveness of the procedures used. Various
organisations have submitted comments, a number of Parliamentary
guestions have been addressed to the commission, and successive
Parliament reports on competition policy have discussed these issues
and made recommendations.
The commission has never presented these arguments furry, nor tackled
the issues adequatery in the context of its Annuat Reports, and it
has only responded defensively on other occasions.
The
and
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5r- The paragraphs which follow,then, first outline some of the procedural
issues which are brought out by the gemmission in its Tenth Report
and then briefly review some of the major coments and suggestions
on topics which the Commission has failed to cover.
The Tenth Report limits itself (in points 33 to 57) to describe those
decisions of the European Court of Justice tending to clarify and
strengthen the rules of procedure in competition matters, on the
obligation to notify agreements, on the form of and effects of
notification, on povrern of Commission investigation, on rules to be
followed in the administrative procedure, on the status of so-called
"comfort letters" terminating a procedure, and on the Commission's
powers to take interim measures. lrlithout going into details a nunber
of these points are worthy of attention,
The Court has confirmed the powers of the Conmission to carry out
investigations following a fornal decision vrithout inforning the
undertakings in guestion in advance. This would appear to strengthen
the powers of the Conmission to prevent tampering with needed
evidence (Panasonic case - described in point 43 of the Report).
The Court has also confirmed its earlier decisions that the Commission
procedures in the field of competition are administrative rather than
judicial in nature (Fedetab case - point 49 of the Report). As
discussed later the issue of the nature of these procedures has been
a central feature of the comments submitted to the Commission,
The status of letters terminating a procedure is also discussed in
the Report (in points 50-52). The court apparently regards these
notifications as being simply adninistrative Ietters. WhiIe they
have important legal effects, they cannot be rel ied upon as .rgainst
third parties and cannot prevent national courts, if they so wish,
from taking up the matter,s concerned. Unfortunately, such letters
would thus appear to do little to reduce the state of often prolonged
uncertainty in which many firms can find themselves, almost inevitably.
with such a backlog of cases being dealt with by so few Commission
officials.
Finally the Report outlines the Commission's potential powers to take
interim measures which have been recognized by the court in the recent
Camera Care case (point 55 of the Report). The Commission can thus
take interim decisions using an accelerated procedure "in duly
established cases of urgency with a view to remedying a situation
which may cause serious and irreparable damage to the party who has
requested such measures or intolerable harm to the general interest"
(point 56) - Such a need might come up in such cases as contested
mergers, refusals to supply or unfair pricing practices.
63-
62-
66.
64.
65.
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This recognition of the commission's powers is crearry to be welcomed.
It should be noted though that the Commission, in its informal
"Practice Note", put out in the context of the Camera Care case and
setting out some criteria for deciding upon interim measures, has
adopted a generally cautious attitude. There are clearly certain
questions to be settled in implementing these porrrers, regarding when
the Commission should intervene, the role of national courts, and the
nature of the accelerated procedures which the Commission should
adopt, and so on. The Committee urges that these por.rers be used, and
will follow their practical implementation with close interest.
fn addition to the above issues drawn from the Commission's report
itself, a number of other important issues have been raised in the
context of comments submitted in the Iast few years on the conduct
of competition poticy( 1).
Among the criticisms which have been made are:
the staff of D.G. fV is too small;
too few staff members have industrial experience;
procedures are too slow, and result in too much uncertainty
for frrms;
in contrast to the lengthy periods of investigation the times
allotted for replies from firms are often too shorti
there appears to be insufficient, or haphazard case planning;
the procedures for fact-finding and analysis sometimes seen
inadequate; the economic analysis, such as on the relevant
market, and the exj-stence of a dominant position, are often
weak;
the Commission is investigator, prosecutor and judge at one
and the same time;
defendants are not always kept fully in the picture, are sometimes
given inadequate documentation and given inadequate possibilities
of cross-examining the Commission;
the P.dvisory Committee on Restrictive Practices and Monopolies
may be given inadequate time to study cases, its decisions
should not be kept secr 
"t(21 i
there is insufficient coordination between the work of DG IV
and other DG's within the Commission, they are sometimes given
insufficient time to offer their views;
m; i"stance by the ICC, UNICE, CBI, CCBE, etc.
(2)It should also be noted that in Advocate-General Warner's decision
in the Distillers case (30/78) in which he concurred that there
were certain procedural irregularities, he expressed his doubts
about the secrecy concernirrg the work of the Advisory Committee.
68.
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the remedy of appeal to the Court is not a who11y satisfactory
one in that the Court is not really able to re-open questions
of fact, etc.
The Commission has not specificatly answered these criticisms in
the Tenth Report, nor for that matter in its predecessors. Nor
has it responded to the Parliament's opinion
on the Ninth Report which suggested that employers, trade unions
and consumer associations needed to be given more rnformation on,
and be more involved in competition policy, and which also made
(in point 7 of the Resolution) some specific suggestions for
improving procedures.
The Commission has, however, indicated its general attitude in
response to certain Partiamentary guestions(1), which is that it is
generally satisfied with its procedures and that the changes
suggested are unnecessary and might well have the effect of
frustrat-rng or renderi.ng substant ially more difficult the applicat ion
of ilornmuniIi, competiticrr Iaw. The specifjc comments are rejccted
one-by-one.
The difficulcies faced by the Commission are evident, and must be
recognized. On the one hand they are criticized for being too slow,
on the other of ta)<ing shortcuts and avoiding certain safeguards.
?hey have to protect complainants who may wish to remain anonymous,
aird also sometimes they must make unannounced visitsr let they nust
also guarantee fairness for defendant firms. Some of the criticisms
may represent special pleading. And with a smaLl number of staff
the Ccmmi.ssion must not onJ-y deal with interpretation of Articles 85
and 86, with a caseload growing every year, but also the increasingly
thorny problems posed by state aids and adjustment of state
monopol ies.
Nevertheless, the Commission shor-r}d be more responsive to the
suggestions made, and at least give a nore detailed analysis of why
it considers them to be misguided. Most countries with effective
competition laws have split the functions of fact-finding and
prosecution from final decision-making. procedures with more
confidence reposed in them would be even more effective.
Oral question No. 25 by
No. 677/79 and 2003,/80
Nos . 84 0,/80 and 19 50/80
Mr Ansquer, written questions
by Lady EIles, written questions
by Mrs Walz
7C 
"
7t.
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72. The Commission is therefore called upon to report back to Parliament
with its detailed comments on the advantages and disadvantages of
the following major suggestions for improving its procedures:
- the establishment of an intermediary tribunal to deal with
competition cases, and reviewing questions of fact, with the
present Court of Justice as a final court of appeal, dealing
essentially wit'h points of law. Such an idea has been
tentatively put forward by the court itself in its memorandum
to the Council of August L978;
- the appointment of an independent
be from within the Commission but
appointed by the court, who would
investigatory process, and handle
person or persons, who could
independent of DG fV, or
participate in the
certain procedural aspects;
- ways of expediting procedures for granting exemptions, such as
that suggested by which
'r applicat ions f or
exemption, made in the prescribed form, would be deemed to have
been granted at the expiry of a fixed period, such ,as 90 days,
unless within that period DG IV raises serious doubts as to the
appLicability of Article 85(3)". This would be accompanled by
appropriate safeguards and might initially be limited to certain
. 
categories of case.
73. It is also suggested, in view of the large number of informal
settlements that are made each year (the Tenth Report lists 9
Commission decisions applying Articles 85 and 86 of the EEC Treaty
and 15 applying Articles 65 -.nC. 66 of the ECSC Treaty, but 183
Eettlements without a formal decision being taken in proceedings
under the EEC Treaty) that more information is provided in the
Annual Report on the principles and criteria used by the Commi.ssion
in reaching these settlements, and on the background facts involved.
This could act as a useful guide to concerned firms.
74. There should also be a reinforcing of the economic assessment
capability of DG IV and for its economic research to be better
integrated vrith the rest of its activitiesr
75. FinaJ-Iy, there also needs to be an increase in the number of
Commission staff dealing with competition matters, including staff
with appropriate industrial experience.
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77.
Final remarks
The fina] section of
of concentration and
Most of the section
would be helpful to
in future reports,
the Commission's Report examines the development
competition within the Community.
78.
is guantitative and descriptive in nature. It
have somewhat more qualitative interPretation
Nevertheless, there is one central conclusion to this section which
is a striking one indeed. namely that (page 179) 'rdespite the many
special aspects involved, a tendency seems to be emerging towards
keener competition in the Communityn for certain mass consumer goods,
and this is evidenced by the arrival of new products and few
manufacturers and in many cases in relative fal1s in prices.
Furthermore it may well be (P. I97) "that a new Pattern of markets
is emerging which are competitively open structures" and that the
relatielhigh level of concentration and the oligopolistic nature of
these markets do not impede new entrants and even encourage the
development of competitive behaviour".
These are welcome conclusions, which contrast sharply with the more
guarded comments about the possible dangers of oligopolization and
of price disparities, which emerged from the Ninth Report- The
conclusions of further Commission Reports on this theme are thus
awaited with great interest.
Nevertheless, one comment which has been made several times in the
course of this report again needs to be re-emphasized in this
context, and this is the need for the economic research carried
out in DG IV to be better integrated with the rest of its activities.
This report has hinted at a number of areas where economic research
can back up competition policy, definition of the relevant market for
individual products (which might mean the worldwide market for
certain products), more rigorous analysis of the advantages and
disadvantages of market concentration at Community level as well
as of distribution agreements, the economic arguments concerning
patent licensing agreements. Other themes such as the long-term
impacts of state aids on industrial structures, (a recent Swedish
study has outlined certain long-term adverse impacts of such aids),
and the role of competition policy in promoting the new information
technologies might also be explored.
79.
80.
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81. A further conment concerns the contents of the Report. It would he
helpful if, besides the descriptions of the actions of the Conmission
and Court, and the developments in national policies, the positions
of industry associations, trade unions, eonsumer groups and other
groups were presented, if only in summary form, in future Reports.
Reactions to specific proposals would be especially helpful in this
, respect. Furthermore, a greater readiness to outline criticism of
the Conmissionrs proposals and procedures on the part of the
Commission would surely not weaken the Comnission's competition
policy, but could even strengthen it in the long run.
82. Finally, the Commission has never adequately responded to calls to
discuss competition policy within the wider context of other
Community policies, and other national policies affecting competition.
Past Parliament opinions have talked of the adverse effects of the
Iack of fiscal harmonization, energy pricing disparities, and so on.
Most striking of aII. perhaps, is the persistence of technical
barriers to trade within the internal market, and where new barriers
spring up as soon as o1d ones are removed. The distortlons caused
to competition are clearly great. Better integrated Community
policies are thus called for if the internal market is to be
strengthened. Besides this the links between competition and other
Community policies, notably in the industrial and commercial reLations
fields, was strongly emphasized earlier in this report. A better
coordination of Community competition policy with other Community
objectives will thus be needed in the future.
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orr 15 Jrrre 198I the l€gal Affairs Acmittee was asked. to gi\re its cpinion on the
lEnttr lteport. or CcrnpeEitior Policy to tlte Ccmittee qr Eccrrcuric and lbnetary Affairs.
On 26 Jrme I98f the I€gal Affairs Ccrsnittee appointed I4r lbgahy draftsman of the
cpinion.
The tegal Affairs Coreittee exanined the draft opinion drawn up by
I.fr Megahy at its meetings of 22 and 23 september 19gl and of 19 and
20 October 1981 and adopted the draft opinion unanimously at the latter
meeting.
Present: Mr Ferri, chairman, Mr Turner, vice-chairman;
Mr Megahy, rapporteur, Mr Da1ziel, Mr Guersten, Mr Janssen van Raay,
Mr tilalangr6, Mr Peters (substitute for Mr Plaskovitis), Mr Prout,
.,..
l{r Sieglerschmidt, Ivlr Tyrrell and Mr Vetter.
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I. Introduction
1. For the first tine since direct, elections, tte I€gaI Affairs Connittee novr discusses
ccnpetiticn larp and poliey. Ttre Ccnmi'ctee . acloowledges tj:e Ccmnissionrs efforts
in the last 19 years in enforcing EEC ccnpetition 1avr;
this has contri5uted. to cpening up natioral marl<ets and afforded @nsurrers a beteer
ctpice of prodrcts.
2, The Leqal Affairs Ccnrnitteep in its selection of a nr-uriber of subjects rofrich have
been'treated in -,he @unissiqr's Ttenti Report. on Cotpetition Poliry, will C"iscuss the
folloring:
(1) excLusirre dealing agreenents (cf Tenth Repofc, pts 1-4),
(21 adninistrative preeeCings before the. Counission (cf Tenth Rqrrt, pts 33-57),
(3) nerger control (cf Tenth Report, pts 20-21),
(4) the Craft patent licence gror,p ererption (cf Tenth Report., pt 6),
(5) aies wi'.fr special reference to ttre Philip lrtorris case (case 730/79)
(of Tenth lGport, pts 158-227, eqpecially &s 2Lt-217)
I!. E<clusirre dealing agreernents
3. fhe rcnth Report. Coes not give nn:ch co\rerage to ttre Court of Justice's ru1ing in
Distitlers v @nnissiqr (case 30/78)I, wtict, raises irrE.prtant policy consi&raLions as
regaris (i) the need to crpen tip t}'e interrral IEC narl<et and (ii) the ned 'Lo protect-
tlre sole clistri-br:itor agaiast ttre'free ridert','t}te "fnee rider" is the econcrn-ic
operator r+ho effects paralle1 irports of the prodrcts Cistrilnrted by ttre official
distributor.
4. Distillers cperated a dual price syston, one price for vtr-isl<y sales on the UK
raarket, and another (higher) price for wtdslcy sales on the Continent. The difference in
price was considerec'. by Distitlers justified as tlreir official dis'Sibutors on tlre
I tggO EF..2229. In the Tenth Report the oistitlers case is nentioned at points
23, 33 and 37
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Continent neecled support in return for thejr prorctional and other efforts in
penetrating the Continental narket and ccrpeting against, tax-farrqrred Iaal drinlss.
I1re Ccrrrission in its Disti[ers Decision (1979 O, L50) rejeceed these arguments. The
Cou::t of Justice disnissed Distillers' claixr on a tetnicality (the general conditions
of Distillers had. not been nd.ified, in due form Lo the Ccnudssion so that an exgqTtion
under Article 85(3) was not availabl-e) wltkrout going into the nerits. Be Adrreai=-
General found. largely for DistiUers. the upshot of the DisLillers oecisisr was tlre
withdrararal of Johnny tlafker i'(ed label frcrn 'ttre uK market.
5. v,ltriLe basica[y agreeing with the Cqunission's policy ttnt parallel inports must
be permitted if national, markets are not to becqne isolated, rle f€4ral Affairs Comdtqee
r"rould v,elccnre an erchange of vierm with ttre Ccnrrission as regards i:Le need to protect a
distributorrs investment (a d[stributor rqcnrld of@n only be a sma].l or nediun-sized
undertalcing) against tte "free-rider'n perhaps, fon a limited tire onIy, by neans of a
Cual price stnrcture or ccrlpersa'torl, palments frcm the r,unufastr::rer to !r-is official
distributorto ccrpensatc h-im for loss of potenl:ial- cLien{'-s. fflqr el], tlre @runission
permits a certain atcunt. of client restriction in selectirre dis'cri5ution ag[:eements
(cf Tenth Report, pt Sl)1.
5. Ttte Tenth Report at point 3 j-nti:nates that. 'che Cqmuission nay resenrc Regulation
')
67/67- for e:<clusive selling agreements (wtrereby a manufaccuner agr@s to seIl his
orodudcs in a given market only to an appointed distriSutor for resale in the rnarket)
and proolrce a separate regulation for exclusive sryp1y agreelrent-s tvttereUy an undertalcirtg
agEees to secure tds suprplies of a given proobct only fnon a specified manufacturer for
i:esale on a given market). Perhrys it t/rorild be in 'tt!e interests of grea*:er legal
certainty, for "requirementslt con'cracts, where an un&rtaking alfrees to secure tr-i.s
srryplies of a girren nrodudc (nort necessarily for resale but for furt}er praessing),
eitherto be included in ttris separate Rryulation or to fo:tn'LJre sulcject of an
e<n1anatory Cornuission Dlotice.
For god oxenples of pe:rnit'Eec'. selectirre ijs'i:ri5u'tion agr@fisnts, cf the CourSls judge-
ment in the tleLro case (case 25/75, 1977 Et 1875) and. the @nrrission's Decision in
B4''r (197s qTTZg-I
1967 JO No 57
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geveptheless the I€al Affaj-rs CcEwnit-tee tg.rld.Ueleqre the ro_pportunity for .the
Eurcpean ParliraenC -ro debate,.ths fin+l draft of.@rrissionr Regulatiqr 67/67, ccrplere
,.,. d& npdtficBHi.srqq betore,i'Cs e@tiorf. Qy, .tfie Ccnqrission. I
i',; !,, ,.., :
S- Hither+q 'Se denrcl-ognBnt, of the EEc,'-E.cqrpetiti.cn,]ew has been nnne concerned
!trFh subQtantlver'Iqet'ters.rather than wi*h p-trqcedre.r, Flcnverrer, as ijre Tenttr p.errcrt:
on,Ccrpet*itio,n Pgli.cy sfuds, ,,Ufie.Court Of, Jupticecs, atfentri_on has been recently irar*n
- to procedurel, Pfchlenp,heL-eeen tI6 Csnnission'and'undentaldngs whose activiLies a::e
belng inrrestigated by ttre @rmission.
'r. 
*rg l€gal Affaips Conruittee coqsicers'thati, arongst possible tryics of cliscussion,
,i J.t vould l,r,lSe, to rajse, @.subjects:. , . ..,., - . : ..
. - [g) the cqrrissign as..bo'uh proswutor and,iucg+,i.n acrri-nis'tra,;ive 5xocaeiings
copdnclgd UV UF Qonnission; 
,.i
. ,,.(b), '** 4glFY,,.$etregn notificapinyr.gfrm agrFr.E4F uner Regui.at:ion t7/62 and the
adoptjgn of .th9 Coroisoionls formal Decision.
(a) Ttre Ccnmi-ssion-as r gnq 
.iuggg
, .10-.. , thq,fqgf.s-,gurrounding tlre follovring cases_.fiuqgestrthat r:ndertakjngs being
^',ipvestigatedb,y.tlp,Ccnrnission pr.q,serhaps not canEene lrith the a&ninistrative procerJure
that.iS fol]cmpd1 i ... . ,.,,,,. ..,, ,r.,
'. .,,.(a) in joined.cases 20? - 2ls/78 end, ?1$lz8-,@, (rgg0 EcR 3L25), sqbnr_issions raised
i.t , $te cqgni.q€ipnr iaclrded the follorringel , ,,
. .,,- 
. 
(i). 
-' .ths,Cquuission refusqd !o hear qertain.intereeged associations of wholesarers
and retailers;
(ii) the C.r:nrn-ission refused to accede to Fedetab,s request to hear associations
of r*rolesaLers;
I Proposed anen&rents to Regulation 67/67 pubrished in r97g or c31
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(c)
(iii) the @nnission refused to disclose tIe file containing the cvidence on
tetrich t}e @runission's case against Fedetab was based.
Ihe Court rejected alL three sr:braissions, but as regards sr.rbnission (iii) held
that.it had not been prored ttrat as rqard.s essentiaf facts, ttre Ccnrnission
refused to prod:ce tlre relevant dm:rnents (cf Tenth Report, p* 44-49)i
(b) in case L55/79 AM & S v. @rmission (not yet decided) Hhere $te @nnission affiJms
that it has the right (i) to inspect a dm.unent, for utrictr the un&rtaking
being investigated claims privilege, (in this case dauments kEtween 1a'qrer and
client) and tlren (ii) to &ide whsther or not t}te docunent is privileqed. Ttre
Ad,v@ate{ereral disagrreed wittr the Ccrranission's suhnission (cf Ninth Report,
pt 136);
in case 36/78 Distilters v Ccnrrission (1980 Em 22291, the plaintiff ccnplained
that (i) the Adrrisory Ccnndttee, retaen consulted by ttre @rmission, rras not jn
possession of tIe nd-nutes of Distillers' hearing before tfie Cqrurission, (ii) t]te
Adrrisory Comrittee was not given serreral supplenents to ttre plaintiff 's ans€r
to ttle staterent of djeciions and (iii) the Adyisory Ccnrnittee was fonvarded a
ccnplete tect of the third party interrrenerts ccnqrlaint, wtrereas only an e:<cised
rrersion was forrrarded to the plaintiff . Ilxe Co:rt did not consider these alleged
irrqularities (cf Pt 4 ahnve).
1I . The i.€Ea] Affai.:rs Corrrittee noEes ihat neither in ttre Tenth Report on Ccnpetition
poliry nor in its previous r@orts has the Ccnunission carzied ouL an appraisal of its
adninistrative preedures irr ttre field of ccnpetition. Ihe l€gal Affairs Ccrmdttee
r*ould welccne a dialogue wlth ttre Ccnunission on 'ctr-is subject and on tlre basis of 'clrese
and qther cases suggests that ttre Ccnndssion consider ilre possibility of *hnitting the
wtrole file to tlle undertakings concerned before 'che statement of objections (exccPt vfiere
outstanding cases for the need to protect professional secrecy dicta'iE oehenrrise) ancl
of giving ttre r:ndertalcings concerned sufficient tfune in r+trich to ansiver 'Jre sai<l state-
nr3nt.
-40- PE 74.354/fin.
L2. If the Ccrnnissjon !v3re to &r tlis, this 'rpuld go BonE way to dncrrrorlnq a charge.
made by the lnternaLional Chamber of Ccnnnrce ulrcady in 1975:l
"Facts are collated by the Ccnrnission frcrn uarious sources, but
the accused party is often not inforned sufficiently early of
all the facts on vhich the Ccrun-ission bases its charges and
subsequently its decision so that in such instances the party
in guestion is unable to correct, qrralify or aqclify ttpse facEs.
Ttre resul-t is that in these caes it is only wtren the Ccrrn-ission's
decision is handed dqrn ttnt tt beccnes evident that ttre charges
and,/or decision harre been based either on inccngclete facts, or on
a misnderstanding of the facts, onitting r*tt,at to ttte
accused party are irrportant considerations. EVen at that stageit may soretimes be difficult for the accused to be clear as to
wtrat facts ttre Conrdssion has used to arrirre at its decisicn,
since the Ccrrmission's reasoning may be insufficiently set out."
Fllrther on the sare ICC dmment reads:
"In practi<r ttro hr.arings are uced by Un Ccmnieslon as ir
ftrrther rrlans or' seokjng information, often to acftl erphasis
to the charges wtrich have been made and to the draft decislon
which has already been prepared, but sLdcrn provide adequatc
opportunity for ccrurent by tle aceused pa::ties."
The Legal Affairs Ccnrrittee rrculd relccrne an cpportunity to discuss the possibility of
having independent.hearing ocuniners distincf frcnr the jr\restigative senrices of the
Corunission, as ttris is an issue wtLich has given rise to perhaps justifid adverse
criticism.
(b) lte Sf.X lgg,rgel noliIigalign_qg€r Bggt+gtiog lzl0? etg ltE
lggmi.sgign_s_dgc!s!o1
13. the lrenth Report infor.ms us that in 1980 ttre Ccnunission tok 9 decisions applying
Articles 85 and 86 mC Teaty and settled scnre 183 cases without a fornal clecision.2
Ttrese rculd presunably have been settled and terrnilated with a so-ca[ed rccrnfort letterr
sent to the undertaki.ng concerned by a senior @muission official stating that the
Cormission with its clDrent knoiledge of the artailable facts considers tle agreement or
pracEice not to be'caught by Articles 85 and 86. Hcrrrever, a 'ccrnfort letter' is neither
a negative clearance or an e:<orption under Article 85(3).
Ihe Corrt of Justice's decisions in the Perfr.une case (joined cases 253/78 and I to
1 rcc p"ri" D@. No. 225/206
2 Cf n"r,tn Report, pE 104
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3/79 and case 37/79,1980 FfR 2327,248L and 2511) and the Or6.rL case (casc 3Il80
not. yet reported inthefm)l rather dimirrish the attraction of a 'ccrnfort lettert
for the follcrrring reasons:
(a) "Ccrnfort letters" termjnate the provisional validity of 'old' agreements
(agreenents in force before Regulation L7/62 was adcrpted)2, thus rendering the
agreements concerned liab1e to be declared void by a national court if ttrat
courE, belierres the agirercnt to be contrary to Article 85(1).
(b) /\s regards Inert agreenents (concluded since Regulation L7/62), no provisional
validity frcrn the date of notification exists and reeipt of a tconforE letteri
neans that an exenption is unlikely. Thus, the possibility that the agreenent
might later be declared illegal by a national court and indeed even by the
Comrission re[nains.
14. the l,egal Affairs Connittee is concerned that econcrnic operators r+ouId be deprived
of legal certainty for their agresrcnts j.f the tfue-lag betrrneen notification and
decision is too long (in Canpari. it was 15 years).3 l,egal certainty is necessary if
they are to carry out iavestnen'Es and other cperations in god heart. iCcrnfort
Iettersr may be an a&nilistrative convenience but do not really give rmrch rconfort'
to ttle recipients.
fV. Tlre draft patent licence grorp exerqoi,ion4
15. The draft Regulation on the patEnt licence group exerptions will only afford
exenption to licencing agreernents l*rere eitlrer the licensor grants ttre licensee an
I cf r,"rrth R@ort, pts 50-52 for these cases
2 n grrl"tion L7/62, L962 .1o No. 13, anrended by subsequent Renulatiors pulclished i11
L962 JO No. ]62 and 1971 ql L285
3 C.nuni=sion Decision Canpari 1978 OI L7O
4 cr t rrth Report, pt 6
5 tglg qr c 58 and r1o
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er<crusive territory rvtrere neither the licensor nor other ricencees may se]l directry
the patented prodrct, or the licensee agrees not to sell the licensed prodrct in a
territory reserrred for the licensor or cther licensees, but on condition that the
annual turnover of the licensor or the licensee des not o<ceed I00 million U.A.
16. The Legal Affairs Ccrunittee belierres that by not affordhg the group benefit of
a properly limited exploitation territory to large underEakings, the Ccnrnission
might be restricEing ttre flow of nerr technology fron large undertakings to srnall and
nediun sized undertakings and frcrn large ttrird ccnnrtry undertakings to I:rc undertakings.
l\fter all, an exclusive territory only restricts ccnpetition ttrat r,rpuld not c,ther^rise
er<ist witlrout the patent licence.
In the cpinion of the l€qa1 Affairs Ccflrnittee, the draft Regulation is also a
disincentive fon knorrhcry licences, as to benefit frqn the grorip q<srprtion (i) no
territorial exclusivity r+ould seecn to be permitted, (ii) tlre licence r+ould not be
limited in tiIIE but rrcu1d be virtually perpetuaL. Nerrerttreless, tIe @rrrittee considers
that it is right that field of use restristions of licensed kncnrrhcnr should not be
permitted.
L7. @rtainly, the fact that knqrhor.r licences may virtually not be linited in tine
is a serious disincentive to transferring technology and ignores the rsprj.ng-boarct'
doctrine prevalent in the (x and in the Federal Republic of Ccrmany, as weII as in the
USA, t+trcreby an undertakiog (ie. the licensee) should not have a head-start on his
cotpetitors by being able to retairt licensed kncnr-hcw that has not faLlen into tte
public dcmajr.
18. To overcqne these difficulties, under:takings may notify their agreernents to the
Comrission, with a visrr to obtaining an individrat e<erqrtion, but the hazards and
delays involtred are set out in Section III (b) above.
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v. l,brger controll
19. The l€ga1 Affai-rs Corsnittee shares ttre @nnission's disappointment that the
Co:ncil has not yet adcpted the Ccrrunission's proposal fon a Cor-urcil Regulation on
.)
rerger 6ntro1.- Hqlerer, this Connittee believes that at the roort, of the problenr
is the highly politica-1- nature of fierge.r control inherent in the relevant legislation
of scre l4ember States.
20. In the UK, for exanucle, there is no obligation to notify, but nergers creatilg
a inonopoly or involving the take-over of assets i.n o<cess of E5 million may be referred
by the ccfipetent minister to the I'lonopolies and lGrgers Ccxrunission. llooerrer, the
ninister is not cbliged to make such a referral. E\rrthermore, the ninister aLone
decides on what action to take, even when he chooses to refer the nerger to the
t4onopolies and librgers Ccmnission. The political nature as crpposed to the juridical
nature of IJK l4erger cqrtrol was illustrated recently in the newspaper sector: wtry was
the take-orrer of Tines N*rspapers by I{r RuperE !4rdah (the cnrmer of t}re 'SLlnl
nempaper) not referred to tlre l,lonopolies and lGrgers Cormi.tte, wtereas ttre rninister
referred to the MII{C the prcposed take-over of the robserverr ne$EpaFEr by the Ionrho
industrial group?
2L. In Etance concentrations of undertakings vrtrose turnover o<ceeds 408 of consurption
in the gods or seryices concerned or of uncierEakings of whcnr at least two have turnovers
each o<ceeding 252 of con$fiE]Eion jrr the go<1s or senrices of a sjmilar nature, are
subject to control. Hcr.Jever, notification is not obligatory, but cptional. Ttre
ccrpetent minister may take action against the concentration if the 'bilan &oncrnique'
warrants it.
Cf Tenth Report, pts 20-21
Cqruri.ssion proposal pulclished 1973 OI C 92; F,uropean Parlianrent's opinion (1974
OT Cz3)basecl on ttso Reports by !,ir Artzinger frcs 263/73 anC 362/73 and on Mr
Bermanirs opinion <rrawn up on betralf of the Lqal Affairs @nnittee flcc, 263/73/P{trt.
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22- rn Ireland also the cqpetent minister has the pcnrer of fi11al decision as to
the fate of a notified nerger. At any rate nrergers involving undertakings each with
gross assets in excess of E1.5 million or w"ith tumover in excess of E2.5 million
rust be notified to ttre ccnpetent ninister.
23- In the Federal' nepublic of @rmany, the control of rergers under the Gesetz
gegen WettbsrerbsbeschrEnkungen of 1957, is strlcject to less potitica] influence.
Any rerger which increases or creates a market share by or of 208 or involves an
undertaking w"ith a 208 market share in anotter market or involrres undertakilgs with
a ccrrbined turnover in e:<cess of t[r! 500 million or rrith a ccrnbined r+orkforce of over
10,000 tErsons must be notified to t}re Bundeskartellant before or after the ac't of
nErger. The B.rrdeskarfellanrt is an independent a&ninistrative authority. Ho1ever, ttrcre
is a political content, for the l4inister of Federal Econcnrics may authorize a rrerger,
prohibited by the hndeskartellamt if the interests of the economy as a wtple are
senred.
24- Denrnark, Belgiun, the Netherlands and rtaly have no thorough rules on rrErger
control. In Luxembourg, tlre ccnpetent rn-inister may terminate a nerger or take-over if
its effect on ccrpetition r,puld be contrary to ttre public interest-I
25- The Legal Affairs Cqmittee considers it inportant that there is sorc control
of nergers at connunity lerrer if any comncn industrial strategy is to ererge.
\II. State aids
25- Prcrninence in the Terrttr Report is girren to the philip lr4orris case (case 730/79,
not yet reported in the ECR) wtrere the arvard of a general state aid was declared by the
C-crmission to be incorpatible with the ccnrnon market. philip }tkrrris challenged this
decision of the @nnission.2
A_trcrking paper (PE 73.148) prepared for the Ccnnrittee on Econcrnic and MonetaryAffairs girres a syncpsis of the legislation in the different Ivtetnber States, nol only
on tte:gsi control but also on ccnpetition law generally
Cf Tenth ReporE, p+us 2L2-2L7
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27. One upn&rs wttether Philip lbtris in respect of its investrnent in Berqen-op-Zocr,r
would have received its state aid wittrout Any lntenrention on ttre part'of the Ccnmission
or indeed with the Ccnrnissionrs hlessiig)l it ttre state aid flad been ar,arded ir the.
context of tstrc Drtch rqional aid progrdnrne, ttre "Investeringsprentieregeling", jlt which
Bergen@-Zon is desigrnated as a deVelopnent centre (cf pt 167 Eighth ReporE on Ccnpetition).
28. Etrthermore tte sunmary of tte Ccmnission on t}te legal position of state aids
given at pt 216 of tte Tenth ReporE is misleadi-ng, as ttre said surunarl, should only be
aprplicable to 991rerq]. state aid schqres. After aII, tJre Courtrs ruling in Philip
Itbrris was concerned wittr a general aid schere.
\rI. Conclusion
29. In conclrrsion the I-ega1 AffaJ.rs Ccmrittee draurs to the atcention of the Conrdttee
on Econcrnic and l4onetary Affairs che follor+ing pojxts :
(1) the desirability for Lhe Eurcpean ParLiament to debate the final- texL of
Ccrimrssion Regulation 67 /67 and of the draft @nnission Regulation granting
a block exerption to certajl patent licences before the Ccrnnission defini-
tively adcpts Lhese Lexts (cf. points 2-7 ard points 15-18 above);
(2) wh-ile endorsing the Ccrwnissionos policy of prcnoting a single Ccruunity mar-
ket through paralJel jmports, the Legal Affairs Ccrudttee considers that the
sma1l or nu:dium-sized drstributor representrng a new product shouLd be given
greater protection, even for a l-j-rnit-ed tinE, than that cr:rrently available
nnder RegrulaLion 67/57 (cf. points 3-7 ab<.:.'e);
(3) thc adninistrative prcrcedrr-re follored dr:rlng Ccxnnission investigations of
aLteged anti-ccnpetitive behaviour is bejlg rore and nore challenged by under-
takings befrcre the Court of Justice (cf points 8-12 above). F\mdalrental ques-
tions include wtrether tlre Ccnun-ission should, in effect, be both prosecutor and
judge during the adninistrative preeedings and wtrether the Ccnnrission shoul-d
transnLit its rarhole file to the undertaklng bejlg inrrestigated (ercept urhere in
resPecl of individual drrcwrents or part of docr.urents outstanding reasons of
professional secrecy dictate otherrarise) ;
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(4) the need for, and the need to define the e)<tent of, professional privi-
lege (cf. point 10 (b) above);
(5) the need to remove the lack of lega1 certainty as to the status of noti-
fied new alFeefixents, by reqqiring the ccrunission to issr:e preljrninarl,
decisions, analogous to the preli-urinary cpinions provided for by Article
15 (5) of Requlation L7/62 withirl a fixed tfue limit, and of 'rcctnfort
Iettersu by requiring ttre Ccnntission to deal with errery notification or
application for negatirre clearance by formal decision or certification
and to publish the sane (cf points 13-14 abtre);
(G) the need for Ccnnunity rules on rrerger control, if any ccfiulcn industria].
policy is to sTerge (cf. points 19-25 above);
(7) the legality of a given state aid Prqtrl.amlE rould sesn to depend overmuch
on the labef attached to it, wtrether it be general, regionaf or sectoral,
as shovn by the Philip l,torris case (cf . poirrt 27 above) ;
(8) tne need for the Ccnrnission to rpnitor the ccnnercial consequences of its
decisions and to include a section in its annual. report eva-luating ttre
effeccs of its decisions on ccnpetition.
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